This article suggests that traditional conceptions of musical ability, as advanced in the psychometric tradition of psychology, tell us very little about the nature of musical behaviour and how it is developed. The psychometric tradition, with its view that musical ability is innate rather than learned, has exerted a powerful and potentially damaging in¯uence on the practice of music education over the past ®fty or so years. It is only relatively recently, mainly in the ®eld of Developmental Psychology, that these ideas have been challenged. In contrasting theories advanced by different psychological schools the article gives a broader perspective to the psychological debate on human intelligence / musical ability and shows the context in which musical behaviour might be viewed as a distinct or even autonomous form of intelligence ± a`way of knowing'. It suggests that musical thinking should be considered as an`intellectual' as well as aesthetic mode of thought and that musical ability, in the traditional sense, has little educational utility or relevance to music as a curriculum subject in schools.
Introduction
Recently, while working as a supply teacher in a failing London secondary school under special measures, I was required to attend a series of in-service training seminars run by the Assistant Director of Education on the subject of promoting intelligent behaviour in our pupils. This, rightly or wrongly, was, for him, the ultimate aim of education. At these seminars it became apparent to me that many experienced teachers held quite clear and ®xed ideas about what they considered constituted intelligent behaviour in their speci®c subject area, particularly when this subject dealt almost exclusively with more propositional and cognitive forms of knowledge (i.e. facts). It also became clear that many senior teachers and educational administrators still hold fast to traditional conceptions of intelligence that really only represent half the story in terms of psychological debate.
As a music teacher I found it dif®cult to make any clear correlation between some of the de®nitions of intelligence put forward and what I might de®ne as musicallỳ intelligent' behaviour. Apart from some Craft Design and Technology and a small amount of Drama offered as part of English, Music stood alone in the curriculum as the only essentially aesthetic`arts' orientated subject. This seems to be an increasingly common occurrence at secondary level where relatively few subjects deal with affective responses and concentrate almost exclusively on cognitive propositional (i.e. factual) modes of thinking and knowing. The often-cited remark of Cardinal Newman, that music is nothing more than aǹ elegant pastime', still seems to persist in the minds of some heads and senior educational administrators. In a society increasingly conscious about`accountability', I often ®nd myself in the position of having to`justify' the place of music in the National Curriculum as a subject that is as much concerned with developing the mind as it is with subjective emotional responses.
While I feel it is inherently wrong to assume that knowledge is only that which can be stated in propositions, or that subjective responses are of no educational value, I still feel that it is possible to be musically intelligent. If I were to attempt to de®ne what I mean by`musical intelligence', I would describe it as`a way of knowing'. To be able to think`musically', whether as a performer, composer or listener, is to be musically intelligent. Traditional conceptions of musical ability, in my view, shed little light on the nature of musical intelligence and how it is developed. This article explores the reasons behind my convictions and shows the context in which music can be considered to be an`intellectually' as well as aesthetically worthwhile subject.
It also provides a broader perspective on the question of whether musical ability is learned or innate. As an instrumental teacher I have often been asked if there are any potential drawbacks in a student beginning specialist instrumental studies who does not come from a`musical' background. Parents are often at pains to point out at the start of tuition that they either have no family history of musical achievement or that someone, no matter how remote in their family history, was particularly musical and that this explains the musical motivations of their child. While there may be nothing essentially wrong with such convictions, traditional conceptions of`musical' people having some special genetic predisposition to music has often tended to undermine the con®dence of beginners and deterred others from even starting.
The view of innate musical ability has, in my view, tended towards a proliferation of e Âlitist practices in music education in which many children have been denied access to worthwhile musical encounters. I have, for example, lost count of the number of students I have taken for private instrumental tuition who were initially turned down by their school on the grounds that they had failed a musical ability test or were considered`unmusical'.
Some of these students went on to achieve a remarkably high standard in performance. I have also taught handicapped children and others with learning dif®culties who, although severely restricted in what they could realistically achieve, gained huge personal ful®lment from active music-making and were tremendously well motivated to learn.
The role of motivation in the acquisition of musical skills has, I feel, been underestimated in the psychometric approach. I therefore examine some theories of learning which attempt to explain this process and explain why some mentally handicapped children may display prodigious musical talent.
Shuter- Dyson and Gabriel (1981) have comprehensively reviewed some twentyfour tests of musical ability. Sloboda (1985) also evaluated most of these. As Hargreaves (1986: 167) observes, psychological research within the psychometric tradition represents by far the most extensive area of psychological enquiry on creativity. It is not therefore my intention to look in detail at the tests themselves or to show how each one may or may not shed light on the nature of musical intelligence. Rather, I intend to examine and explore the overall concept of intelligence advanced in the psychometric tradition and contrast this with other psychological theories. In this way I hope to demonstrate different approaches to the development of musical ability and establish the context in which we can talk of musical thinking as a distinct form of intelligence.
My focus will be essentially psychological and primarily concerned with psychological theories of learning and intelligence, rather than with aesthetic or philosophical questions about the nature of musical knowledge. I do however recognise that, in the broader view and within the context of some psychological approaches also, these are undoubtedly important considerations in examining the nature and context of musical intelligence.
The psychometric tradition
Psychometry is a branch of psychology dealing with measurable factors. It is from this ®eld of psychology that we get the concept of the Intelligence Quotient (IQ) and the subsequent development of tests of musical ability. One of the problems for psychometricians has been de®ning what they set out to measure and an abundance of different terms have been used to describe various musical traits. The scope of this article does not allow a more detailed analysis of these de®nitions and I must therefore take them as read or refer the reader to the body of literature for further clari®cation.
For example, the terms`musicality',`musical talent',`musical ability' and`musical capacity', as Lundin (1953: 174) points out, are often used indiscriminately. In his view, musical talent refers to the capacity for musical performance, whereas musicality is the capacity for musical reception. Musical capacity and ability, on the other hand, refer to`inborn traits', a view shared by both Seashore (1938) and Schoen (1940) (also see Lundin, 1953: 184) . This concept of musical ability advanced in the psychometric tradition, particularly by Seashore and Bentley, has had a considerable in¯uence on the practice of music education over the past ®fty or so years. However, as Bentley (1966: 9) observes, there has been considerable disagreement about the nature of musical ability:
It has to be accepted that the measurement of musical ability has not moved beyond a rather rudimentary and unsatisfactory stage. Nor could it be otherwise whilst there exists no agreement on what musical ability is. We may be able to recognise it, or think we can, but we cannot as yet de®ne it.
In my view, this position pertains equally to the term`musical intelligence'. Despite this, or perhaps because of it, there has been a considerable amount of work in the psychometric tradition concerned with the application of techniques for testing and measuring various musical traits or abilities.
As Mursell (1937: 287) observes, this has developed along three principal lines: (a) Attempts to measure musical capacities or aptitudes. (b) Attempts to measure musical achievement, such as aural perception, technical abilities and skill in reading music. (c) Attempts to measure knowledge about music. All three could loosely be termed`tests of musical ability', but what might these tests tell us about the nature of musical intelligence?
Concepts of intelligence and musical ability Entwistle (1988: 147) This, in my view, is also the underlying assumption of musical ability tests. Generally speaking, however, the core subjects of the National Curriculum tend to re¯ect a widely held view of what intelligence is; to be good at Maths, Science or English, is to be intelligent. The media also tend to advance this narrow view with programmes such as`University Challenge',`Master Mind' and other increasingly abundant quiz shows which reinforce the propositional view of knowledge which Langer (1957) , Reid (1986) and others have all challenged.
While I feel it is inherently wrong to assume that knowledge is only that which can be expressed in propositions, can we talk of being`musically intelligent' or is intelligence a general phenomenon con®ned only to propositional realms of thought? If we can talk of`musical intelligence', do tests of musical ability identify this trait let alone reliably measure it? What might such tests tell us about the individual or groups' potential' for musical`achievement'? To answer some of these questions we must ®rst look at some contrasting theories of intelligence and how they relate to the concept of musical ability.
The relationship between general intelligence (`G') and musical ability Seashore (1938) , Bentley (1966) and others saw no correlation between musical ability and intelligence as a general phenomenon whereas Schoen (1940) , Mursell (1937) , Farnsworth (1958) and others have all reported a positive relationship. More recent psychological research, however, presents an alternative perspective that could radically alter our perceptions of human intelligence and our approach to teaching music, as Entwistle points out:
For teachers, assumptions of intellectual consistency might have unfortunate consequences for their approach to teaching.
Theories of multiple intelligence
In recent years, traditional conceptions of what constitutes human intelligence have been challenged and, according to Plummeridge (1991) , it is only recently that we have come to talk of musical`thinking' as a distinct or even`autonomous' form of intelligence. In my view, these theories are of far greater signi®cance when related to the aesthetic theories of Langer, Reid and others mentioned earlier.
In the ®eld of psychology, Howard Gardner (1984) and J. P. Guilford (1967) have advanced theories in which human intelligence is viewed as a multi-dimensional phenomenon. The`Structure of Intellect' model advanced by Guilford, proposes some 120 different forms of intelligence, or`vectors of mind. Here,`abilities' are seen as an integral part of a general intelligence (`G') rather than as a combination of varying amounts of general intelligence and some content-speci®c factor as proposed in the`two-factor' theory of C. E. Spearman (1927 Spearman ( & 1930 .
As Hargreaves (1986) observes, Guilford's theory of cognitive abilities is the main theoretical model for psychometric approaches to the testing of creativity. This is à person-based' approach that centres on tests of`convergent' and`divergent' thinking in which creativity is viewed purely as a cognitive operation. While Guilford, like Thurstone (1938) , advances a pluralist or multi-factoral approach, abilities are still conceived as being part of a`general' intelligence and are theoretically conceived within the psychometric tradition. Alternatively, Gardner (1984: 320) , who refers to the two major schools in the psychology of intelligence as`Hedgehogs' and`Foxes', posits only six (more recently, seven), relatively autonomous`intelligences' of which music is but one type. These views are of singular importance to music educators and musicians. As Gardner (1984: 4) points out:
Only if we expand and reformulate our views of what counts as human intelligence will we be able to devise more appropriate ways of assessing it and more effective ways of educating it.
In this speci®c context, do tests of musical ability shed any light on the nature of musical intelligence? Are ability tests of any use to us as a diagnostic tool in telling us something about an individual's potential for progress and achievement in music? As a large proportion of work in the National Curriculum is done in groups rather than on an individual basis, their educational utility in this context would seem to be limited. Mursell (1937) believes their practical utility as educational instruments to be rather slight but their`psychological' signi®cance to be very far reaching due to the underlying assumptions about the nature and functioning of the musical mind on which they are based. Sloboda (1985: 233) points out that the purpose of musical ability tests is quite different from that of examinations in music:
Whilst examinations presuppose intensive preparation of speci®c materials, tests of ability involve no foreknowledge of test content. Indeed, such tests are invalidated by extensive practice on the task they contain. This is because of the rationale which underlies their construction.
This underlying rationale is, as Hargreaves (1986: 25) points out, designed to assess an individual's`potential' for skilled musical behaviour`regardless' of previous musical learning experience. In this view, children are initially considered to have a relatively common exposure to and involvement in music. However, as Sloboda (1985) explains:
Because of differences in innate potential, motivation or experience at certain critical periods, the`take-up' of musical knowledge varies from child to child. Thus, even before some children are selected for specialist training, they have come to differ from one another quite widely in the stock of underlying skills and sensitivities they possess.
This view places emphasis on the individual's environmental and innate predisposition to musical stimuli, but what might this`stock of underlying skills and sensitivities' be? Swanwick (1988: 54) believes that the observation of children's spontaneous musical behaviour is likely to tell us much more about such phenomena than the limited activity of testing will allow. I will return to this point later when discussing theories of musical development. However, Gardner (1984: 104) argues:
there is very little dispute about the principal constituent elements of music, though experts will differ on the precise de®nition of each aspect. Most central are`pitch' (or melody) and`rhythm' . . . next in importance only to pitch and rhythm is`timbre' the characteristic qualities of tone.
From this we might start to suspect the type of reductionist argument advanced in the psychometric view. However, in de®ning these central elements or`cores' as he terms them, Gardner places the`affective' aspects of music very close to these cores:
From the point of view of`hard' positivistic science, it would seem preferable to describe music in terms of objective, physical terms: to stress the pitch and rhythmic aspects of music. . . . Yet hardly anyone who has been intimately associated with music can forbear to mention its emotional implications.
Shuter-Dyson and Gabriel (1981: 254±5) cite a number of tests which have attempted to measure the ability to discriminate between musical meanings in which ability was related to neither intelligence nor musical ability test scores, but to enjoyment.
Again this raises more philosophical and aesthetic questions about musical ability. Is it appropriate to conceive it as a set of hierarchically ordered skills? While Gardner concedes the role of audition as being crucial to all musical participation, he argues that there may also be other aspects of musical experience accessible even to those who cannot appreciate its auditory aspects. The musician Evelyn Glennie, despite being profoundly deaf, maintains that she can`hear' music through her body. Bỳ hearing' Glennie means that she is able somehow to sense vibrations and rhythm through her body rather than aurally.
This would seem to support Gardner's view that, not only rhythmic organisation, but also many other aspects of music exist apart from purely auditory realisation and where synergistic interaction of other`intelligences' may also be signi®cant factors in the development of musical ability. However, many standardised musical ability tests in the psychometric tradition tend to focus on individual performance over a relatively narrow group of core skills in auditory aspects of music, such as the discrimination of pitch and pulse. Entwistle (1988: 148) comments on the concern many psychologists have expressed at the rash of tests of narrowly de®ned speci®c abilities. This concern could equally apply to tests of musical ability. Mursell (1937: 49±98) points out that while identifying and discriminating between sounds in terms of their pitch component is an important consideration for musical ability, it is not so exclusive as is often supposed. Responsiveness to pitch, rather than being a ®xed innate ability, as Seashore maintained, may be susceptible to improvement through aural training. Like Gardner, Mursell (1937: 72) maintains that responsiveness to pitch, as with response to other musical elements, is by no means con®ned to the ear alone but is also a characteristic of the central nervous system. Furthermore, Mursell (1937: 152±3) considers that the concept of rhythm advanced by some psychologists to be incorrectly based on assumptions about innate or instinctive tendencies. While he concedes the legitimacy of some claims concerning instinctive rhythmic proclivities, he argues: such views as ordinarily understood involve a far-reaching error which results in mistakes both in interpretation and practice. Perception does in fact tend to fall into simple intelligible forms, a consideration of the greatest importance which we have seen formulated in the Law of Pragnanz by Gestalt psychologists. But that the organisation of perception is due to an instinctive drive which operates apart from learning is untrue.
Gestalt theory and its development and elaboration with reference to music through the work of Meyer (1956) , particularly with regard to the principles of pattern perception and`The Law of Good Continuation', have had a seminal in¯uence in this ®eld. However, as Meyer (1956) observes, the Gestalt school, in reacting against the sensationist concept of perception and associationist theory of learning, has tended to minimise or deny the role of learning in the perception of musical structures.
More speci®cally, Mursell (1937: 162) maintains that the ultimate foundation for rhythm is to be found in mental activity rather than in instinctive semi-voluntary motor responses to music. He argues that the muscles that control movement are operated by the higher nervous centres and are therefore susceptible to training. In an earlier paragraph, however, he quali®es this by stating that there is also some truth in the following argument:
that interest in and response to rhythm, whether in music, poetry, the dance, the visual arts, or anywhere else, is due to an instinctive demand for beauty or simplicity or proportion, for order as contrasted with disorder, and that this is an innate tendency on the emergence of which, apart from learning, we can rely.
This seemingly intractable dichotomy between`nature' and`nurture' has established a paradigm central to the psychological dialectic of musical intelligence and its development during the past ®fty or so years. Is musical behaviour learned or is it innate? If it is not innate, how is it acquired? Is there an identi®able pattern or sequence of developmental stages through which the musical progress of children can be traced? In addressing these crucial questions we need to examine some of the theories advanced in the ®eld of developmental psychology.
The development of musical intelligence and ability
A considerable amount of psychological research on the musical development of children has been undertaken in recent years, particularly in the United States, which has attempted to map out developmental models of music based on Piagetian theories generated in other areas such as mathematics. One of Piaget's main critics with regard to artistic development was Howard Gardner whose work has already been brie¯y discussed. Swanwick (1988: 54 and 1994: 95) has expressed his concern with approaches that attempt to approximate musical experience and development to models generated in areas other than music. Similar criticisms have been levelled at the indiscriminate application of Piaget's theory of Genetic Epistemology to the ®eld of music. Piaget himself never wrote on this topic. Swanwick (1988) advanced the theory of a developmental spiral in music which is also, to some extent, based on Piagetian concepts, though fundamentally different in its conceptual framework from the American research reviewed by Hargreaves (1986). Their work was based on empirical research directly related to music and draws on Piaget's theories of play, rather than on his analysis of`scienti®c' thought structures. However, Swanwick (1988: 53) has this to say with regard to the developmental sequence theory: I want to suggest that there is a sequence, an orderly unfolding of`musical' behaviour, that there are cumulative stages through which the musical behaviour of children can be traced. It would be unwise to be too dogmatic about identifying broad developmental changes to a fairly standard timetable, especially to generalize this to almost`all' children. Gardner (1984: 108) also proposes a rough and ready portrait of early musical competence. Here, the majority of children make little signi®cant progress after school years begin due to the relatively low niche which musical attainment, in comparison to linguistic competence, occupies within our culture and where musical illiteracy is the accepted norm.
It is widely accepted, for example, that a person can have a`reading age' above or below their chronological age, or that their numerical ability is above or below average for their age. It is not quite so clear what levels of competence we should expect at different ages in music, although the National Curriculum, for example, is largely based on assumptions regarding`stages' of musical development. The reality, of course, is that children's musical development at any given age can vary enormously between individuals.
Shuter-Dyson and Gabriel (1981: 171±93) review a plethora of psychological research on the genetic heredity of musical ability that would seem to run in families and tends to support the view that musical ability is largely innate. However, Lundin (1953: 184±91) maintains that studies of family histories can support a view that musical behaviour is acquired just as well as they can support the theory of inheritance.
Similarly, Gardner (1984: 113) cites examples of famous musicians such as the renowned pianist Arthur Rubinstein who came from a family in which nobody, according to Rubinstein, had the slightest musical gift. His home did however contain a piano, which he felt`motivated', and was encouraged to play from an early age. What factors might be involved in providing the motivation for children to acquire and develop musical behaviour? In addressing this question it is necessary to examine some theories of learning.
Theories of learning
In considering the role of motivation in the development of intelligence, Furth (1970: 140) equates Piaget's concept of intelligence with creativity: because in Piaget's view, intelligence is identical with development, with going beyond present structures and an active transformation of present situational data. I have consistently argued that our traditional view of intelligence is too limited in scope and impoverished by its failure to integrate intrinsic motivation. Gagne (1977: 243) working in the behaviourist / associationist tradition, observes that conditioning in the classical or Pavlovian sense can produce learned emotional responses to stimuli and that it is often the reward which provides both reinforcement and motivation for learning. This is what he calls`Stimulus Response Learning'.
In Rubinstein's case this reward was undoubtedly his ability to impress his family and overcome the speech problems he experienced during his childhood. This would seem to support the theory that musical ability is learned rather than innate. Gardner (1984: 120±2) observes that unusual musical talent is a regular feature of certain anomalies such as autism where the child may cling to music because it represents an island of preservation in a sea of impairment.
The way in which people with various disabilities tend to compensate by a heightened sense or ability in other areas, seems to be a common enough feature to speculate that such adaptation in the evolution of human intelligence was needed for survival.
Conclusions
Generally speaking, the circular argument that is often levelled against IQ tests, is that they retain the assumption about the nature of intelligence built into the test; that intelligence' is what intelligence tests test. This, in my view, applies equally to tests of musical ability. Whether or not they shed light on the nature of musical intelligence would then depend on how the particular tests de®ne and accurately measure this trait.
The general validity of such tests, as Sloboda (1985: 236) observes, lies in the selection of sub-tests used, the age group for which they are designed and the standardisation procedures and reliability of validity studies. This would invariably involve trying the tests out on a broadly representative sample of the population in order to gauge the average test score or`norm'. This, as Mursell (1937: 327±30) observes, might not be as scienti®cally accurate as some would assume:
In spite of the astonishingly, not to say arrogantly overcon®dent statement by certain self-styled authorities, our actual knowledge concerning the distribution of musicality in the population . . . is exceedingly slight.
In discussing IQ tests, Entwistle (1988: 141±6) also points out that, in practice, even the best psychometric tests rarely have a reliability coef®cient in excess of 0.92 and that this margin of error could only ever be acceptable if the tests really do measure the elusive quality of`intelligence'. The following passage that he quotes from Vernon (1970) is, in my view, as relevant to tests of musical ability as it is to IQ tests:
Far too many psychologists and sociologists assume that test scores and the psychological lay term`intelligence', are interchangeable. But tests are merely a (particular) sample of cognitive abilities.
The extent to which some tests of musical ability, based as they are on reductionist assumptions regarding the uniform auditory components of music, are truly representative of musical intelligence is open to question. In any event, such tests may not measure those speci®c abilities that they purport to with any accuracy, if at all.
While some tests in the psychometric tradition have attempted to measure affective aspects of musical experience they have assumed that this is primarily a cognitive operation. As Hargreaves (1986: 50) observes, the arts may transcend the distinction between affect and cognition as, for Gardner, aesthetic objects are the objective embodiment of subjective experience. Gestalt theory as advanced by Meyer (1956) may go some way towards explaining such phenomena in cognitive terms but there are also other more aesthetic perspectives relating to the work of Witkin, Langer, Reid and others, in which feeling and emotion can be regarded as`intellectual' traits.
Furthermore, musical ability tests may not take suf®cient account of the ways in which individuals are initially exposed to or encounter music or the ways in which various aspects of musical intelligence interact with each other as Gardner (1984: 119) observes:
there is a tremendous range of types and degrees of musical skill found in the human population; since individuals differ so much in what they can do, it is conceivable that the nervous system can provide a plurality of mechanisms for carrying out these performances.
How can we know which tests, if any, might shed light on the nature of such mechanisms'? Here I am in agreement with Swanwick's belief mentioned earlier, that we are likely to learn more about such phenomena through the observation of children's spontaneous musical behaviour than we are from testing.
It might also be argued that classroom teachers, being concerned with broader educational goals, are more inclined to be concerned with musical`achievement' (at least initially), than with musical`ability'. Unlike instrumental music teachers, who might wish to use some form of testing in the selection of pupils for specialist instrumental tuition, classroom practitioners are required`by law' to teach music in the National Curriculum to`all' children between the ages of seven and fourteen years,`regardless' of their abilities. In this context, the educational utility of musical ability tests is strictly limited and inappropriate. Their`psychological' implications however, as Mursell earlier noted, may be highly signi®cant in terms of understanding how different aspects and component parts of music may be`perceived' by the brain in different individuals.
However, it has also been suggested that social and cultural differences may account for variations of performance in ability tests and for this reason, ShuterDyson and Gabriel (1981: 204±15) review a number of tests that attempt to take these factors into consideration. It might, nevertheless, be argued that the vast majority of musical ability tests are conceived in terms of Western tonality and that environmental factors conducive to the early development and reinforcement of musical behaviour, are more likely to be found in homes of higher socio-economic status.
There is also the question of how we might interpret the results of musical ability tests and whether these scores do in fact measure innate or learned abilities as Vernon, who I quote here from Entwistle (1988: 146) , observes: intelligence scores are achievement measures just as much as are reading or arithmetic scores, and they are equally required to be`explained'. The former does not cause the latter . . . (but they do) sample the more general conceptual and reasoning skills which a child has built up largely outside the school, and which he should therefore be able to apply to the acquisition of more specialized skills in school.
All classroom teachers have a statutory duty in the National Curriculum to ensure adequate provision is made for less able students and that programmes of study are suf®ciently differentiated to take account of pupils needs, backgrounds and`stages' of musical development. As has been shown there is considerable disagreement amongst psychologists as to what these stages of development might be and whether they conform to a uniform pattern in all children of a similar age and maturity. This, in my view, is one of the primary reasons why music, as a general school subject, does not conform so readily to current educational theory and philosophy. It has not proved practicable to establish a`differentiated base-line on which to monitor musical achievement ' (D.E.S. 1991) in`all' children.
On the other hand, the psychometric concept of musical ability has exerted a powerful in¯uence on the practice of music education over the past ®fty or so years and, to some extent, continues to do so. The concept of the`genius' with the high IQ is still perpetuated in the media through their emphasis on quiz shows, and the like, requiring mental recall of facts rather than the ability to use knowledge`creatively'. This tends to reinforce traditional conceptions of human intelligence as being founded on only one form of knowledge ± the propositional.
Of all areas of human endeavour, music above all others seems to have suffered from a potentially damaging and commonly-held belief amongst the beginner musician and lay-person, that in order to achieve anything worthwhile in music, you must ®rst have some special innate ability or God-given talent and be born into a musical family. That is not to deny that`gifted' people certainly do exist, but does it necessarily follow that music is a no-go area for the vast majority of the population? If this were so, what would be the point of music in the National Curriculum?
I believe there is a sense in which, to a degree, we are all musical and possess the potential for`intelligent' and`worthwhile' engagement in music. I feel it is our duty as educators to develop these abilities and sensibilities, in whatever shape or form they may manifest themselves, to the fullest in`all' our students. Having said this there is an important distinction to made between music`in' education and music education as Plummeridge (1977: 57) points out:
that we differentiate between concepts that lead us to an understanding`about' the arts (i.e. propositional knowledge) and the perceptual abilities and skills (concepts in the second or musical sense) that are necessary for the practice of performance and understanding in the arts.
In considering the place of music as a general school subject, can we really expect anything other than a rudimentary understanding of music when, so often, students are given neither the time nor appropriate resources with which to develop the necessary skills, techniques, procedures and methods, and make them their own.
The fact, as Gardner observes (1984: 109) , that music is not generally valued in Western society accounts for the rather underdeveloped state of musical competence in which assumptions about innate musical abilities tend to further undermine and inhibit the con®dence of the uninitiated. In African tribal societies for example, music is much more highly valued and, while they still have their`virtuoso' musicians, almost everyone will be a competent musician and take part in musical activities from an early age. Indeed, music is an essential and integral part of tribal life through which the young are educated in the mores of their community.
As Gardner (1982) rightly observes:
For most of humanity, and throughout most of human history, the process and products involved in artistic creation have been far more pervasive than those employed in the sciences. In fact, logical scienti®c thought can be considered an invention of the West in the wake of the Renaissance ± an invention which is still restricted to a small enclave of thinkers; participation in the literary, musical or graphic arts, on the other hand, has been widespread for thousands of years.
Despite this, music still occupies a marginal position as a foundation subject in the National Curriculum that is often low on the list of educational priorities when it comes to allocating time and resources. This position has not been helped, at secondary level, by the drive for stronger vocational links in education and changes in emphasis in subjects like Craft Design and Technology and English Literature. This has further marginalised the arts to the extent that music often represents the only essentially aesthetic subject in the curriculum in some secondary schools. In challenging the traditionally narrow view of human intelligence, based only on certain types of cognitive operations, Gardner's Theory of Multiple Intelligence provides an alternative perspective to the question of musical ability in which musical behaviour can be considered as a distinct and autonomous form of intelligence. Drawing, as it does, on other ®elds of enquiry such as medicine, philosophy, neurophysiology, biology and anthropology, it makes a valuable contribution to our understanding of musical behaviour as well as broadening our perspectives on the value and signi®cance of the arts in education and society generally. In this view, music can be seen not only as an aesthetic subject concerned only with subjective affective responses, but also as a worthwhile`intellectual' pursuit.
